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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J. H., by and through
his Guardian ad Litem,

H.

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
WEST VALLEY CITY, WEST
VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
and JENE V. LYDAY, individually

]
]I

Case No. 900052

Defendants-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATUTORY AUTHORITY CONFERRING JURISDICTION ON THIS COURT
Jurisdiction of this appeal is proper in the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j) whieh
states:
"The Supreme court has appellate jurisdiction
. . . over , , . orders, judgments and decrees
of any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction."
A

review

Utah

Code

Annotated

Section

78-2a-3,

outlining th*»< )>it s<:. ' wn of the Utah Court: ot Appeals, indicates
that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to
hear any appeal of a District Court Civil Dispute.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was West Valley guilty of "deliberate indifference"

to the rights of its r 11; I zeits iihen it hired »J pol we
1

otficei and

placed that officer in charge of young people without having
conducted a complete and thorough investigation of the officer's
background, including psychological testing?
2.

Is there a constitutional "right of privacy" which

would protect an individual from undesired sexual molestation and
abuse at the hands of a police officer acting under "color of law"?
3.

Is a police officer acting within the course and

scope of his employment when he sexually assaults an individual in
the context of activities authorized, directed and approved by the
officer's employer?
4.

Is a municipality liable for the acts of an employee

who has been placed in a position of management and trust by the
municipality,

and that employee

later takes advantage of the

position in which he has been placed to sexually molest one who has
been placed in his charge?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (See Addendum).

2.

Utah

Code

Annotated

3.

Utah

Code

Annotated

4.

Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-9 (See Addendum).

5.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) (See Addendum).

6c

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) (See Addendum).

Section

67-15-6(7)

(See

67-15-6.5

(See

Addendum).
Section

Addendum).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff filed claims against West Valley City and the
West Valley City Police Department

(hereinafter "West Valley")

alleging negligence in hiring, Respondeat Superior, and violations
of 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983. These claims arose from sexual abuse
which was committed by the Defendant, Jene V. Lyday, on two or more
occasions in April of 1986.

This is an appeal from the trial

court's order granting the summary judgment motion of West Valley.
Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff's claims against West Valley were filed on or
about October 7, 1987.
negligent

in

failing

Plaintiff claimed that West Valley was
to

completely

and

thoroughly

check the

background of Lyday before hiring him as a police officer and later
installing him as the advisor of a Law Enforcement Explorer Post
organized by the City.
Valley's

failure

to

Plaintiff

completely

and

further alleged
thoroughly

that West

check

Lyday's

background before hiring him as a police officer constituted
"deliberate indifference" toward the rights of the citizens of West
Valley which would subject West Valley to liability under 42
U.S.C.A. Section 1983.

Plaintiff also alleged that the abuse and

assault committed by Lyday was, given the peculiar facts of the
case, within the course and scope of Lydayfs employment with West
Valley and that West Valley would therefore be liable to Plaintiff
under the theory of Respondeat Superior. Plaintiff finally alleged
that West Valley is liable for the acts of Lyday because it had
3

placed Lyday in a position of trust and authority, whereby Lyday
was able to defraud and otherwise take advantage of Plaintiff.
Wfest Valley filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with
memorandums

in support

thereof.

opposing summary judgment.

Plaintiff

filed

memorandums

A hearing was held before Judge David

S. Young of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
on October 30, 1989.

Judge Young ruled that there was no genuine

issue as to any material fact regarding any of Plaintiff's claims,
and that West Valley was entitled to summary judgment on all claims
raised by Plaintiff.

A written order was subsequently signed by

Judge Young on November 29, 1989 granting summary judgment to West
Valley as to all claims of Plaintiff.
The summary judgment granted in favor of West Valley was
not a complete and final disposition of the matter inasmuch as
claims against Jene Lyday still remained pending.

A Rule 54(b)

certification was therefore signed by Judge Young on January 17,
1990.

Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal was later filed on January 26,

1990.
Facts
Jene V. Lyday was hired as a police officer by West
Valley in July of 1980.

(Lyday Deposition, pp. 10-11.)

The

decision to hire Mr. Lyday as an officer was made by David C.
Campbell, the newly appointed chief of the West Valley City Police
Department.

(Affidavit of David C. Campbell, para. 13.)

Mr.

Campbell had known Lyday previously, as both had served on the Salt
Lake City Police Department.

(Lyday Deposition, pp 9-10.)
4

The

only background check to confirm Mr. Lyday's fitness for service
as a police officer consisted of (1) a criminal background check,
and (2) an "extensive Personal Statement Form" completed by Lyday,
wherein he was given an opportunity to list examples of prior
conduct or other information which might disqualify him from
service as a police officer. Beyond the criminal background check,
there was no attempt to verify Lyday's claims in the Personal
Statement Form.

There was no attempt to contact his wife, family,

friends or associates.

There was likewise no effort to perform

psychological testing, which might reveal deviant characteristics.
(Affidavit of Gerald Maughan, paras. 10-12; Lyday Deposition, p.
49.)
Mr. Lyday was subsequently asked by Chief Campbell to
serve as the advisor of a Law Enforcement Explorer Post which West
Valley had determined to organize and sponsor.
serve in this capacity.

Lyday agreed to

(Lyday Deposition p. 16; Affidavit of

David C. Campbell, para. 16.) He was not required at this time to
undergo any additional testing or background checks to verify his
fitness to serve in this delicate capacity.

He served as the

advisor to the Explorer Post from September of 1984 to April of
1986.

He did not submit to any ongoing training program during

this period of time, nor was he observed or supervised by any other
person in the fulfillment of his duties.

(Lyday Deposition, pp.

15, 24, 43-45, 48-49, 62-63.)
Plaintiff

joined

the

Law

Enforcement

sponsored by West Valley in October of 1985.
5

Explorer

Post

(Affidavit of J. H.,

para. 1.)

Plaintiff joined the Post because of his interest in

police work and his desire to consider making police work his own
career.

(Lyday Deposition pp. 22-23.)

He, along with all other

young men and women who joined the Post, was informed at the time
of his acceptance into the Post that it was imperative that he obey
the commands and instructions of West Valley police officers, and
that he would particularly be subject to the supervision, direction
and control of Jene V. Lyday, the advisor of the Explorer Post.
He and other members of the post were advised that failure to obey
the directions and instructions of Lyday could result in dismissal
from the Post.

(Affidavit of J. H., Paras. 5, 8-10.)

While a member of the Explorer Post, Plaintiff performed
various duties and responsibilities. He frequently interacted with
Lyday in the performance of these duties and responsibilities.
(Lyday deposition, pp. 29-30, 34-35, 47-48.)
Lyday finally sexually molested Plaintiff on April 10, 1986,
and again on April 17, 1986. In each of these instances, Plaintiff
was with Lyday in Lydayfs patrol car being driven home following
a Post activity.

(Affidavit of J. H., paras. 15, 17.)

Lyday

committed the molestations under the pretense that he was teaching
Plaintiff
police

standard

officers

occupation.

and accepted

relied

upon

to

"relaxation techniques" which
deal

with

their

stressful

(Affidavit of J. H., para. 14; Lyday Deposition, p.

69.)

6

Summary of Arguments
1.

Summary Judgment should be granted only when there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact after considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.
2.

West Valley acted with "deliberate indifference" to

the rights of its citizens when it hired a police officer without
conducting proper background checks and otherwise verifying the
fitness

of

Lyday

for

indifference" continued

police
when

service.

This

Lyday was placed

"deliberate

in a delicate

position of trust dealing with young people as Explorer Post
Advisor without being properly trained, qualified or supervised.
3.

Plaintiff's constitutional "right of privacy" was

violated when he was sexually molested by Lyday.
4.

West Valley is liable for the acts of Lyday under

the doctrine of Respondeat Superior because Lyday was in the scope
of his employment when the wrongful acts occurred.
5.

West Valley negligently hired and placed Lyday in

a delicate position of trust as the manager and supervisor of young
people in the Explorer Post.

A special situation was thereby

created imposing liability on West Valley for the wrongful acts
which later resulted.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there exists no
genuine issue as to any material fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The
moving party has the burden of proving there is no genuine issue
of material fact and must show entitlement to Summary Judgment
beyond any doubt.

Adickes v. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 157;

26 L.Ed. 2d 142; 9 S.Ct. 1598 (1970). Madison v. Deseret Livestock
Company, 574 F.2d 1027, 1037 (10th Cir. 1978).

In considering a

Motion for Summary Judgment, the materials presented by the parties
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc.. 369 U.S. 654; 8 L.Ed.
2d 176; 82 S.Ct. 993 (1962).

If any inferences can be drawn from

the facts that might allow recovery, then Summary Judgment is not
appropriate. Exnicous v. United States. 563 F.2d 418, 423-24 (10th
Cir. 1977) . Courts are generally not in a good position to render
summary judgment on issues of negligence, and the prerogative of
a jury to make its own determination on such issues should not be
infringed.

Singleton v. Alexander. 431 P.2d 126, 19 Utah 2d 292

(1967) .

8

POINT II
A MUNICIPALITY WHICH ACTS WITH "DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE"
FOR THE SAFETY OF ITS CITIZENS. IS SUBJECT TO SUIT
UNDER SECTION 1983
The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly ruled in the case of
Citv of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.

, 103 L.Ed. 2d 412;

109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989), that a municipality is liable under 42
U.S.C.A. Section 1983 if it acts with "deliberate indifference" to
the rights of its citizens with constitutional violations later
resulting from its failure to screen, train and supervise municipal
employees.
In Canton. the Plaintiff brought an action against the
city alleging that police employees

failed to provide proper

medical treatment to her while she was in custody.
proper

medical

treatment

resulted

in

her

The lack of
subsequent

hospitalization. Testimony was offered to the effect that the city
of Canton did not provide any special medical training for shift
commanders who were responsible for insuring that detainees receive
appropriate medical treatment.

A jury verdict was awarded in the

Plaintiff's favor and the city appealed.
The City contended that only unconstitutional policies
followed by a municipality should be subject to suit under Section
1983. The Court held that "failure to train" actually constitutes
in an appropriate case a "policy" of the municipality and can be
the basis for liability under Section 1983.

(Id. at 1200.)

The

Court noted that all Courts of Appeals have ruled similarly,
9

although there was confusion as to the degree of fault that must
be evidenced before liability can be imposed.

(Id. at 1204.)

The

Supreme Court then defined the standard as one of "deliberate
indifference", stating: "the inadequacy of police training may
serve as the basis for Section 1983 liability only where the
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights
of persons with whom police come into contact."

fid.)

The Court

elaborated:
The issue in a case like this one,
however, is whether that training program is
adequate; and if it is not the question becomes
whether
such
inadequate
training
can
justifiably be said to represent "city policy."
It may seem contrary to common sense to assert
the municipality will actually have a policy
of not taking reasonable steps to train its
employees. But it may happen that in light of
the duties assigned to specific officers or
employees the need for more or different
training is so obvious, and the inadeguacv so
likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights, that the policy makers
of the citv can reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need. In that
event the failure to provide proper training
may fairly be said to represent the policy for
which the city is responsible, and for which
the city may be held liable if it actually
causes injury. (Id. at 1205. Emphasis added.)
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has also found that a
municipality can be found liable for "deliberate indifference" to
the needs of its citizens when it fails to take appropriate steps
to train members of its police force.

In Garcia v. Salt Lake

County. 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985) the 10th Circuit considered
a case where a party had died while in custody of Salt Lake County
jail officials. At the time of his incarceration it was known that
10

the decedent had medical problems, and his jailers were instructed
to check on him every fifteen to twenty minutes.

He died several

hours after his incarceration, apparently due to a drug overdose.
Experts

testified

at

trial

that

proper

observation

by

jail

personnel of decedent's condition would have resulted in his being
transferred to a proper medical facility where his life could have
been saved.

A judgment against Salt Lake County in the amount of

$150,000.00 was awarded by the jury.
On appeal, the 10th Circuit held that failure to provide
adequate medical care is a violation of a prisoner's constitutional
rights

"if

it

is a

result

of deliberate

prisoner's serious medical need."

indifference

(Id. at 307.)

defined "deliberate indifference" as

to a

The court then

"such gross deficiencies in

staffing, facilities, equipment, or procedures that the inmate is
effectively denied access to adequate medical care."

(Id. at 308) .

The Court concluded that the jury's verdict against the County was
supported by sufficient evidence of gross deficiencies in staffing
and other procedures at the jail.

(Id.)

Plaintiff claims that West Valley was deliberately indifferent
to the rights of its citizens when it hired Lyday, and later placed
him in a powerful position of trust and authority over young
people, without first taking appropriate steps to certify that
Lyday did not present an unreasonable danger to West Valley
citizens.

This "deliberate indifference" continued as Lyday was

allowed to interact with the young people and "stalk his prey" with
virtually no interference from superiors to supervise or observe
11

his activities. West Valley counters that it was careful, and that
Lyday was screened through (1) a criminal background investigation,
and (2) an "extensive Personal Statement Form" completed by Lyday
inquiring of prior conduct of a disqualifying nature.

However, it

is clear thcit the criminal background check revealed nothing more
than that Lyday had been successful in repressing his desires,
and/or eluding discovery.

Beyond that, to assume that Lyday would

deliberately reveal his deviant desires in the Personal Statement
Form, and thus disqualify himself from his chosen career, is simply
ludicrous.

It is thus clear that the screening techniques of West

Valley were superficial and inadequate.
West Valley declined the opportunity to conduct more indepth and reliable checks into the character of Lyday.

Interviews

with his wife, family, friends or associates would certainly be
more reliable forms of information than a "Personal Statement
Form".

More importantly, psychological testing might have been

conducted which could have revealed disorders that Lyday outwardly
hid.

In this regard, Plaintiff relied on the Affidavit of Arthur

Brown, Ph.D, which certified that:
1.
those

Individuals with deviant sexual traits gravitate to

occupations

which

will

enable

them

to

prey

upon

children;
2.

Young people are easily influenced and manipulated

by authority figures such as police officers;

12

3.

Appropriate psychological tests which can detect and

weed out individuals who are threats to molest children were
available when Lyday was hired by West Valley.
In Wassum v. Citv of Bellaire. Texas, 861 F.2d 453 (5th
Cir. 1988) the Court considered a case where a police dispatcher
for the Bellaire Police Department was raped by one of the police
officers on the force. The victim filed an action against the city
under Section 1983, alleging negligence in hiring the officer.
The city moved for Summary Judgment which was granted by the trial
court, and upheld by the 5th Circuit on appeal.
Defendants motion

In upholding

for Summary Judgment, the Court noted the

extensive efforts on the part of the city to verify the fitness of
the officer for service:
. . . the uncontradicted evidence reflects that
in 1981 it was the policy of Bellaire to
generally
follow the recommended
hiring
guidelines of the Texas Commission on Law
Enforcement Officers Standards and Education
(TCLEOSE).
In
accordance
with
these
guidelines, Bellaire interviewed supervisors
at two previous police departments that
employed Casey (the defendant); conducted
national (NCIC) and state criminal record
computer checks; submitted Casey's finger
prints to state and federal authorities;
interviewed Caseyfs former wife and several
references; and required Casev to be certified
as physically and psychologically fit by a
licensed physician. (Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, other Courts have ruled that reliance
on lesser standards in the hiring of police officers can result in
municipal liability under Section 1983. In Hild v. Bruner, 496 F.
Supp. 93

(D.N.J. 1980) the municipality appealed

from a jury

verdict for alleged false arrest and civil rights violations under

Section 1983.

Plaintiff's civil rights claims were based on the

failure of the city to administer psychological testing to its
police officers.

Expert testimony at trial established that such

testing had become widely accepted by at least 1975. On the basis
of this evidence, the Court held that the jury reasonably could
conclude that the City's

failure to administer

psychological

testing constituted gross negligence, thus entitling Plaintiff to
relief under Section 1983.

(Id. at 99.)

It should also be observed that standards mandated by the Utah
State Legislature indicate that the screening procedure employed
by West Valley was inadequate in this case. At the time Lyday was
hired as a police officer by West Valley, Utah Code Annotated
Section 67-15-6(7) required that every applicant for a position on
a police force be "free of any physical, emotional or mental
conditions which may adversely affect the performance of duty as
a peace officer."

It would be impossible to confirm that an

applicant is free of disqualifying mental or emotional conditions
without

administering

some

form

of

psychological

test.

Nevertheless, West Valley did not require Lyday to submit to any
psychologiccil or mental testing which might certify his compliance
with this requirement.
suggests

that

West

In fact, no evidence currently available
Valley

had

any

information

as

to

the

psychological fitness of Lyday when he was hired by the West Valley
City Police Department.
The

above

facts

clearly

establish

that

there

are

substantial factual issues which are not resolved appropriately by
14

Summary Judgment.

The standards employed by West Valley in hiring

and supervising the activities of Mr. Lyday do not meet standards
followed by other law enforcement agencies, nor do they satisfy
standards mandated by the Utah State Legislature. Furthermore, Dr.
Brown would testify that appropriate screening and supervision of
Mr. Lyday would likely have prevented the abuse from occurring.
In view of these facts, it is inappropriate for a Court to state
as a matter of law that the City adhered to the standards of care
required of it.

A reasonable juror could find that the City's

deficient procedures evidenced a "deliberate indifference" to the
interests of the citizens of the City.

POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL "RIGHT OF PRIVACY"
WAS VIOLATED
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court have clearly recognized that there is a constitutionally
protected "right of privacy".

In Redding v. Brady. 606 P.2d 1193

(Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a case where
a student newspaper had sought information regarding salaries of
Weber State College employees.

The college refused to provide the

requested information, whereupon the newspaper filed an action in
Court which resulted in a court order requiring the college to
supply the requested salary information.

The college appealed,

arguing that to supply such information would be a violation of the
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rights

of

privacy

of

its

employees.

In

discussing

this

constitutional "right of privacy" the Court stated:
It seems sufficient for our purpose herein to
say that what the right of privacy protects is
to be determined by applying the commonly
accepted standards of social propriety. This
includes those aspects of an individuals
activities and manner of living that would
generally be regarded as being of such personal
and private nature as to belong to himself and
to be of no proper concern to others. The
right should extend to protect intrusion into
or exposure of not only things which might
result in actual harm or damage, but also to
things which might result in shame or
humiliation, or merely violate ones pride in
keeping his private affairs to himself.
Id. at 1195 (Emphasis added.)
The United States Supreme Court has also affirmed on many
occasions that there is a constitutionally protected right to
privacy. This constitutional right of privacy was recognized early
on by the United States Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 38 L.Ed. 1047; 14 S.Ct. 1125,
(1894) wherein the Court stated that the principles that embody the
essence of constitutional liberty and security forbid all invasions
of the sanctity of a man's home, "and the privacies of his life."
[See also Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 14 L.Ed. 2d 510,
85 S.Ct. 1678 (1965) referring to the right of privacy as a right
older than the Bill of Rights; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
19

L.Ed.

2d

576, 88

S.Ct.

507

(1967)

stating

that various

provisions of the Federal Constitution protect personal privacy
from governmental invasion; Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 43 L.Ed. 2d 328, 95 S.Ct. 1029 (1975). See generally
16
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Am.Jur.

2nd,

Constitutional

Law,

Sections

601-603.]

Furthermore, the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C.A. Section 552a)
contains a congressional finding that "the right to privacy is a
personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the
United States."
In Martin v. Covington, Ky., 541 F. Supp. 803 (E. D. Ky.
1982) the Court considered a case where a minor plaintiff had been
forced by police to solicit homosexual acts.

He was not required

to actually engage in such acts, but he was forced to engage in
negotiations for the same.

The Defendants claimed that there had

been no violation of the Plaintiff's Federal constitutional rights,
and that a Section 1983 claim would therefore not lie.
responded: " . . .

The Court

for the police through threats, intimidation,

harassment and abuse of official power to force someone to engage
in homosexual

solicitation

against

his will

is an undoubted

violation of his human dignity and constitutional right of privacy,
and thus is a deprivation of liberty committed under color of state
law.

Such violation may be redressed, if proven, by an action

under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983."
If the right of privacy exists at all, it must certainly
extend to the right of a person to be free from undesired sexual
molestation at the hands of another.
that

Lyday's sexual misconduct

violation

of

Plaintiff's

There can be little doubt

and abuse of Plaintiff was a

constitutional

right

of

privacy.

Furthermore, the violation was committed while Lyday was on duty
with the police department, participating in activities which were
17

approved and authorized by the City.

The violation occurred in

Lyday's police patrol car, with all the paraphenalia
employment

as a police officer close at hand.

It

of his
is thus

reasonable to conclude that the violation occurred "under color of
law", and is actionable under Section 1983.
POINT IV
THE MUNICIPALITY IS LIABLE FOR THE TORTIOUS ACTS
OF A POLICE OFFICER WHO ACTS UNDER COLOR OF AUTHORITY
In Phillips v. JCM Development Corporation. 666 P. 2d
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the general rule
concerning the familiar doctrine of "Respondeat Superior".

The

court stated the rule as follows:
The general rule is that a principal [employer] is liable
civilly for the tortious acts of his agent [employee]
which are done within the course and scope of the agent's
employment [citation omitted].
Id. at 881.
In Birkner v. Salt Lake County 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah
1989), the Court stated:
As a general rule, the issue of whether an employee acted
within the scope of employment is a factual question to
be decided by the trier of fact [citation omitted]. The
scope of employment issue must be submitted to the jury
[w]hen€*ver reasonable minds may differ as to whether the
[employee] was at a certain time involved wholly or
partly in the performance of his masters business or
within the scope of his employment..." [citation
omitted].
Id. at 20.

See also Lane v. Messer. 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986).

In White v. County of Orange 166 Cal. App. 3d 566, 57172, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1985) the County was held civilly liable
for an officer's threat of rape because it was done under authority
18

of a Deputy Sheriff, an agent of the County.

The Court found that

the actions of the officer were "incident to his duties".

The

policy arguments cited by the Court in reaching this conclusion are
very pertinent to this case, and are therefore cited at some
length:
A police officer is entrusted with a great deal of
authority. . . . the police officer carries the authority
of the law with him into the community. The officer is
supplied with a conspicuous automobile, a badge and a
gun to insure immediate compliance with his directions.
The officer's method of dealing with this authority is
certainly incidental to his duties; indeed, it is an
integral part of them. . . .
It follows that the employer/government must be
responsible for acts done during the exercise of this
authority. In Clark Equipment Co. v. Wheat (1979) 92
Cal. App. 3d 503, 154 Cal. Rptr. 874, the court, quoting
the Restatement, 2d, agency, stated: If the principal
places the agent in a position to defraud, and the third
person relies upon his apparent authority to make the
representations, the principal is liable even though the
agent was acting for his own purposes [citations]. The
theory is that the agent's position facilitates the
consummation of the fraud, in that from the point of view
of the third person the transaction seems regular on its
face and the agent appears to be acting in an ordinary
course of the business confided to him. It is immaterial
that the principal receives no benefit from the
transaction, [citation omitted].
This reasoning directly addresses the situation presented
here. White alleges she stopped solely because she was
ordered to do so by the Deputy Sheriff. In other words,
she relied on the officer's apparent authority.
Had
Laudermilk not been a Deputy Sheriff, in uniform, in a
marked patrol vehicle using flashing red lights, White
would not have stopped at his direction and the events
that followed would not have occurred.
Because the
County placed Laudermilk in this position of authority,
they will be liable for his actions should White prove
her allegations at trial.
The use of authority is incidental to the duties of a
police officer. The County enjoys tremendous benefits
from the public's respect of that authority. Therefore,
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they must suffer the consequences when the authority is
abused.
In Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge, 380 So. 119, 121, (La.
App. 1979) a woman filed a complaint against the city alleging a
cause of action under respondeat superior for sexual acts which a
police officer forced her to engage in against her will. The court
ruled that there was a valid claim against the city:
The City maintains that the actions of Crowe (the police
officer) are far removed from the course and scope of his
employment and that it should not be vicariously
responsible for sexual abuses committed by its officers.
Due to the particular facts of this case, that argument
has no merit.
We particularly note that Officer Crowe was on duty in
uniform and armed and was operating a police unit at the
time of this incident.
He was able to separate the
plaintiff from her companions because of the force and
authority of the position which he held. He took her
into police custody and then committed the sexual abuses
upon her in the vehicle provided for his use by his
employer.
A police officer is a public servant given considerable
public trust and authority.
Our review of the
jurisprudence indicates that, almost uniformly, where
excesses are committed by such officers, their employers
are held to be responsible for their actions even though
those actions maybe somewhat removed from their usual
duties« This is unquestionably the case because of the
position of such officers in our society.
In another Louisiana case, Turner v. State, 494 So. 2d 1292,
1295-6 (La. App. 1986) the Court held that the State was liable
for sexual abuses committed by a National Guard Recruiting Officer.
The recruiting

officer had represented

to women whom he was

attempting to recruit that he was authorized to perform physical
examinations.

He was thereby able to persuade the young women to
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disrobe and submit to his examination.

The court discussed the

Statefs liability as follows:
If the tortious conduct of the employee is so closely
connected in time, place, and causation to his employment
duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly
attributable to the employerfs business . . . it can then
be regarded as within the scope of the employee's
employment, so that the employer is liable in tort to
third persons injured thereby.
Sudduth's (the officer's) battery upon the young women
was closely connected in time, place, and causation to
his employment duties. The sergeant visited the girls
in his capacity as a recruiting officer after they
expressed a desire to enter the Louisiana National Guard.
The Turner home where the incident occurred was located
in . . . the recruiting area assigned to Sgt. Sudduth
and the incident occurred during working hours. During
the interview process, he mislead the young women into
believing that he had authority to conduct a physical
examination. Thus, the tortious conduct committed by
Sgt. Sudduth was reasonably incidental to the performance
of his duties as a recruiting officer although totally
unauthorized by the employer and obviously motivated by
his personal interest.
Furthermore, the sergeants
actions were so closely connected to his employment
duties that the risk of harm faced by the young women was
fairly attributable to his employer who had placed the
sergeant in a position of trust and authority in
contacting young persons for recruitment into the Guard.
Sudduthfs conduct, we conclude, was within the scope of
his employment.
The State of Louisiana is thus
answerable in damages for the injuries sustained by the
Plaintiffs.
In this case, Lyday assumed roles of a police officer and
a teacher/advisor.

Both roles had been conferred upon him by West

Valley, which authorized, directed and sanctioned his position.
West Valley entrusted Lyday with a powerful position of authority
over Plaintiff, both in his capacity as a police officer and as
advisor to the Explorer Post.

West Valley taught, directed and

insisted that Plaintiff and other members of the Post follow the
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direction of all police officers, especially Lyday.

Plaintiff

would have been subject to discipline and possible expulsion from
the Post if he had not followed Lydayfs directions.

Within the

hours of Lydayfs work and the boundaries of his employment, (that
is the city assigned police vehicle,) the incident occurred while
Lyday was supposedly teaching Plaintiff how to cope with stress as
a police officer. As in those cases cited above, the municipality
endowed its employee with extraordinary power and authority which
enabled the employee to sexually exploit another. The municipality
should therefore be liable for the consequences of its agents
misconduct.
POINT V
WEST VALLEY NEGLIGENTLY HIRED
AND SUPERVISED ITS EMPLOYEE, AND PLACED
LYDAY IN A POSITION TO DEFRAUD
AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OTHERS
In Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986) a Honeywell
employee, Messer, left work at 5:00 p.m., went home, changed
clothes and then drove his Honeywell van to a club to drink with
friends.

On his way home from the club, more than seven hours

after leaving work, an accident occurred.
on the clock with Honeywell.

Messer was clearly not

The Supreme Court ruled that there

was no basis for imposing liability on Honeywell, and sustained the
trial Court's grant of Honeywell's Motion for Summary Judgment.
In so ruling, the court discussed the issue of Respondeat
Superior.

The Court noted that "[t]he question of whether an
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employee

is acting within the scope of his employment at a

particular time is normally a question for the fact finder" (Id.
at 490).

In a concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman observed that

there are circumstances where an employer is liable for conduct of
an employee, even though outside the scope of employment. Justice
Zimmerman referred to Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 315
(1965) which states:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to
another unless...a special relation exists between the
actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the
actor to control the third persons conduct...
Id. at 492.
Justice Zimmerman continued:
In some cases, a special relationship may exist between
an employer and an employee that will give rise to such
a duty to control even when the employee is acting
outside the scope of employment. However, because the
employee is acting outside the scope of employment, the
exposure to liability . . . does not arise simply because
the employment relationship exists; it is imposed only
when special circumstances exist and are known to the
employer.
Id. at 492.
In Aaarwal v. Johnson 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141
(1979), the Court noted one of those "special circumstances" which
will impose liability on the employer.
was

found

employees.

liable

for

willful

In that case, the employer

misconduct

of

its

managerial

The court stated:

The reason for the imposition of liability is to
encourage careful selection and control of persons placed
in important management positions [citation omitted].
Id. at 67.
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Lyday

certainly

fits the criterion

"important management position".

of being

in an

Besides his general managerial

power as a police officer, he was specifically

placed

in a

management position as Explorer advisor over Plaintiff, a Law
Enforcement Explorer.

Lyday directly supervised Plaintiff on the

nights of the incidents.

West Valley was using Plaintiff, under

Lyday's management, to free it's paid employees for other duties.
West Valley must be careful to insure that employees
granted positions of power and authority will not abuse their
position of trust.

Imposition of liability on West Valley would

encourage careful selection, screening, supervision and control of
persons placed in important management positions.

These policy

considerations are especially compelling in a situation such as
this where the persons being supervised are young and vulnerable.
West Valley City may not avoid liability by saying it
didn't know what was going on.

In Lane v. Messer, Supra, Justice

Zimmerman stated:
For example, an employer must exercise reasonable care
to control an employee acting outside of the scope of
employment to prevent that employee from creating an
"unreasonable risk of harm to others" if the employee is
using the employer's chattels and the employer "knows or
should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising control".
Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 317 (1965); see also Ann. 48 ALR 3rd 359,
Section 2(b).
Id. at 492 (emphasis applied).
Because of the special relationships involved here, West
Valley had a special obligation to screen, train, observe, and
supervise Lyday.

Had it fulfilled these duties properly, West
24

Valley would have known that Lyday was not an appropriate person
to be working with young people and could have prevented the injury
to Plaintiff.

It cannot hide behind the fact that it simply did

not look.
CONCLUSION
There

are

numerous

facts

in

this

case

upon

which

reasonable minds could rely to conclude that:
1.

West

Valley

was

grossly

negligent

and

ignored

statutory requirements when it hired Lyday without
conducting appropriate background investigations and
psychological testing;
2.

The gross negligence continued and was compounded
when Lyday was placed in charge of vulnerable young
people;

3.

Sexual abuse committed by Lyday in his car on police
time was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy
committed under color of law;

4.

Wrongful acts committed by Lyday on company time and
while otherwise engaging in authorized activities
subject West Valley to liability under the doctrine
of Respondeat Superior; and,

5.

West Valley placed Lyday in a special position of
trust whereby Lyday fraudulently took advantage of
Plaintiff.

With the above factual issues remaining to be resolved, it is
clearly inappropriate to rule as a matter of law that there is no
25

set of facts upon which a jury could reasonably rule in Plaintiff's
favor. The summary judgment of the District Court should therefore
be set aside, with this case remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

1 3

day of

/vn a A A. R-4- .

1990.
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN
& BOUD, P.C.

Richard I. Ashton
Wayne H. Braunberger
David A. Wilde
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27

ALLAN L. LARSON (A1896)
RICHARD A. VAN WAGONER (A4 690)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants West Valley
City and west Valley City
Police Department
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JASON HEPLER, by and through
his guardian ad litem, DENNIS
HEPLER,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Civil NO. C87-06590

Plaintiff,
Judge David S. Young
vs
WEST VALLEY CITY, WEST VALLEY
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, and
JENE V. LYDAY, individually
and as a Police Officer of
west valley City,
Defendants.

Defendants west Valley City's and west Valley City Police
Department's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court
for hearing on October 30, 1989, pursuant to request for oral
argument and notice under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

Plaintiff was represented by Richard I. Ashton

and Wayne H. Braunberger and defendants were represented by Allan
L. Larson and Richard A. Van Wagoner.

Having considered the oral

arguments of counsel and reviewed the entire file, including
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memoranda in Support
Thereof, plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment and the depositions, affidavits and pleadings,
and being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby enters
summary judgment for defendants, for the following reasons:
1.

No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect

to whether plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivation aiose
from a policy, procedure, custom or practice of the defendants
because the undisputed facts as a matter of law do not rise to
the level of a showing of deliberate indifference by defendants
to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and
2.

No cognizable, recognized constitutional right or

interest was deprived or implicated by the acts of defendant
Lyday; and
3.

No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect

to plaintiff's claim of respondeat superior because the
undispute'd facts show that defendant Lyday's conduct toward the
plaintiff was not of the general kind the employee was employed
to perform, was not generally directed toward the accomplishment
of objectives within the scope of the employee's duties and
authority or reasonably incidental thereto, was not a part of the
employer's business and the duties assigned to Mr. Lyday by the

-2-

employer, and was not motivated by the purpose of serving the
employer' s interests;
4.

No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect

to plaintiff's negligence claim because the undisputed facts show
that defendants did not know, and had no reason to know, of a
propensity of defendant Lyday toward sexually deviant behavior,
and absent such notice, defendants had no legal duty to conduct
general psychological or sexual deviancy testing on Mr, Lyday.
For the foregoing reasons, and those reasons set forth in
defendants1 Memoranda in Support of the Motion for Summary
Judgment, incorporated by reference herein, defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment should be and is hereby granted as to all of
plaintiff's claims, and plaintiff's Complaint is hereby disr.issel
with prejudice as against West Valley City and its Police
Department, and judgment is hereby entered in favor of west
Valley City and its Police Department as against the plaintiff,
no cause of action, defendant to recover costs.
fT>

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

^

'

,
day of

/'.('l^:-

'•; / • , 1989.

BY THE COURT:

Judge David S. Young i

^'\

RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION DATED JANUARY 17, 1990
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Richard I. Ashton, Esq. (A-0136)
Wayne H. Braunberger, Esq. (A-0434)
David A. Wilde, Esq. (A-4695)
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN
& BOUD, P.C.
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone (801) 263-0300

David J. Bennion, Esq.
PACKARD, PACKARD, BENNION
& BURK
260 Sheridan Avenue
Suite 208
Palo Alto, CA 94306
Telephone (415) 327-0701

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JASON HEPLER, by and through
his Guardian ad Litem, DENNIS
HEPLER

54(b) CERTIFICATION

Plaintiff,
vs.
WEST VALLEY
VALLEY CITY
and JENE V.
West Valley

CITY, WEST
POLICE DEPARTMENT,
LYDAY, individually
City,

Civil No. C87-6590
Judge David S. Young

Defendants.
In accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court hereby expressly finds and determines that
there is no

just reason

for

ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

delay,
DECREED

and it is hereby
and directed

expressly

that

Summary

Judgment in favor of West Valley City and West Valley City Police
Department be and hereby is entered.

DATED this

/ / iSv

or^l

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing 54(b) CERTIFICATION was mailed, postage prepaid, this
I / day of January, 1990 to the following:
Allan L. Larson, Esq.
Richard A. Van Wagoner, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
James M. Dunn
Michael N. Zundel
Laurie S. Hart
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark Emmett
102 West 500 South, #202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

C^O^Ld

130-940,db
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
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42 U.S.C. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part as
follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . .
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunity secured by the constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceedings or redress. . .
Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-6(7) provides in
pertinent parts as follows:
Every applicant for admission to the training
programs conducted by a certified peace officer
training academy. . . shall meet the following
standards
and
requirement
before
being
admitted: . . . (7) free of any physical,
emotional or mental conditions which might
adversely affect the performance of duty as a
peace officer as determined through a selection
process.
Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-6.5 provides:
At the time a person is employed or appointed
as a peace officer the chief executive officer
of the agency employing or appointing shall
submit an application together with the
required background information as provided
for in section 67-15-6. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Annotated Section 67-15-9 provides:
The minimum standards set forth in this act
concerning peace officer qualifications and
training shall in no way be deemed to preclude
counties, cities or towns in establishing
standards higher than the minimum standards
contained in this act. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) provides:
Summary Judgment for defending party.
The
party against whom a claim, counter-claim or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
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judgment is sought may, at any time, move with
or without supporting affidavits for a Summary
Judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides:
Motion and Proceedings Thereon. . . The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories
and admissions
on file,
together with the Affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material
facts and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. . .
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT WEST VALLEY AND
WEST VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
was mailed, postage prepaid, this

day of

AtA^xS't""

1990 to the following:
Allan L. Larson, Esq.
Richard A. Van Wagoner, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
James M. Dunn
Michael N. Zundel
Laurie S. Hart
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

IV^^l Ki*A* LvLgU.
204-230,db
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